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Education and debate
Criminalisation of HIV transmission: implications for
public health in Scotland
Sheila M Bird, Andrew J Leigh Brown
Molecular investigation of an outbreak of HIV at
Glenochil Prison contributed to the conviction of a
former Glenochil drug injector, Mr Stephen Kelly, for
culpably and recklessly transmitting HIV to a female
sexual partner. We explain why the case of R v Kelly
has brought the medical and legal professions into
conflict and explore its implications for public health
and molecular science in Scotland. Firstly, even a mod›
est decline in the uptake of HIV testing by those who
are actually infected could herald a one third increase
in new sexually transmitted HIV infections. Secondly,
there is now need for a national proforma to assure the
quality and legality of HIV counselling in Scotland as a
safeguard for both counsellors and clients. Thirdly, we
discuss curtailment of molecular research investiga›
tions with the potential to discover incriminating
evidence about HIV transmissions unless laboratory
protocols, or legal safeguards, can be designed which
obviate deductive disclosure about individuals. Urgent
review by the Scottish Executive is required to
minimise negative impacts of the Glenochil judgement
on public health and molecular science.
Glenochil judgment
Stephen Kelly was one of at least 14 drug injectors who
became infected with HIV by needle sharing in Gleno›
chil Prison, Scotland, in the first half of 1993.1–3 In June
1993, because of self assessed HIV risk, he participated
in the infection control exercise at the prison.1 4 He
accepted HIV counselling and testing from an outside
counsellor, who informed him of his HIV diagnosis
and gave post›test counselling on the day of his wife’s
funeral.
Subsequently, molecular research studies showed
that 13 of the 14 drug injecting prisoners and a female
heterosexual contact had the same strain of virus.3 Mr
Kelly, one of the 13, is now serving five years’ imprison›
ment for culpably and recklessly transmitting HIV
infection to Miss Anne Craig, the above heterosexual
contact. This is a harsh sentence by international
standards.5 In early 1994, he and Miss Craig had
unprotected vaginal and anal intercourse over at most
two months before she seroconverted. He had not dis›
closed his HIV diagnosis.
Anal intercourse within two months of the start of
a heterosexual relationship is relatively uncommon.6–7
And it was not discovered until after 1994 that the risk
of transmitting HIV from male to female was
quantified as being 20 times greater by penile›anal sex
than by vaginal sex8 9 and 200 times greater if
intercourse occurs during the first three months of
HIV infection.9 This information was therefore not
included in Mr Kelly’s counselling.
Miss Craig, mother of three children (the youngest
then 2 years old), had not had sexual relations since
separating from her husband in 1990. Like a quarter of
women in her age group,6 she relied for her sexual
health on her partner’s denial of any reason, other than
avoidance of pregnancy, that they needed to use
protection. She knew Mr Kelly had a history of drug
injecting and imprisonment.
Notification of HIV, testing, and infection
control
HIV infection is not notifiable in the United Kingdom.
Prejudice about the condition, especially in the 1980s,
led experts to believe that infection control would be
better served by prioritising confidentiality for people
infected with HIV. By encouraging HIV counselling
and testing, doctors hoped that risk behaviours could
be altered, especially after a positive diagnosis.
Summary points
Knowingly transmitting HIV is a criminal offence
in Scotland as a result of the Glenochil judgment
Even a modest fall in the uptake of HIV testing as
a result of the judgment could produce a one
third increase in new sexually transmitted HIV
infections
A national proforma is needed to assure the quality
and legality of HIV counselling in Scotland as a
safeguard for both counsellors and clients
Molecular research investigations may be
hampered because of the ability of the police to
use them to discover incriminating evidence
about HIV transmissions
The Scottish Executive needs to take urgent steps
to minimise the negative effects of the Glenochil
judgment on public health and molecular science
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There was, and is, no compulsion to be tested.
Patients can refuse to give a blood sample for HIV test›
ing even after a healthcare worker has had a
percutaneous injury and are not obliged to disclose
their HIV status before surgery. Newly diagnosed
patients do not have to disclose to healthcare workers
the contact details for unsafe sexual or injecting
partners for the period when they became infected.
Notification of current partners has been done mainly
by the patient, and notification of past partners,
whether by patient or healthcare worker, is rarely done
well.10 11 Use of condoms to prevent sexual transmis›
sion of HIV has been promoted as everyone’s respon›
sibility and as the only protection that individuals have
against undiagnosed or undisclosed HIV infection.
Thus, in practice in the United Kingdom, the confiden›
tiality of the index patient has had priority over
informing and safeguarding contacts—be they health›
care workers, drug injectors, or sexual partners.
Effect of judgment on testing and
infection control
The Kelly verdict has criminalised undeclared, but not
untested, HIV transmission. In Scotland, it is now a
crime for someone who knows that they are HIV posi›
tive and conceals the knowledge to have unprotected
sexual contact with another person and transmit HIV
infection. Knowledge of HIV status, which was
formerly a measure to reduce risk, can now endanger a
person’s liberty in a way that ignorance of it cannot. Yet
ignorance is substantially more dangerous. Even in the
era of highly active antiretroviral drugs, over 40% of
people with a recent HIV diagnosis in Scotland have a
first CD4 count of 200 or less, indicating longstanding
unsuspected infection.12 13 Also, at least one fifth of
unsafe sexual contacts of patients with newly
diagnosed HIV are likely to be infected with HIV.10 14
Notification of partners can alert these people to their
risk of HIV infection, but they can refuse an HIV test
and thereby, despite knowing their high HIV risk,
transmit HIV infection with impunity before the law.
The judgment leaves doubt about which behaviours
are criminal. Is it a crime for someone who conceals
their HIV infection to have unprotected intercourse if
HIV transmission does not occur? Could someone who
conceals their HIV infection be prosecuted if they have
protected intercourse that results in HIV transmission
because, for example, a condom breaks? Analogy with
other crimes against the person suggests both could be
crimes, as is the case in Canada.15 We also do not know
whether transmission of other known, but not admitted,
sexually transmitted infections qualifies as a crime
against the person. If untreated, some cause serious long
term injury. And is it a crime, not just contraindicated,
for an HIV infected mother in the United Kingdom to
breast feed her uninfected baby? Serious confusion
about legalities can only negatively impact on efforts to
improve sexual and public health in Scotland, as we
illustrate below for new HIV infections.
Assessing the effect on new HIV
infections
Scotland has an excellent HIV surveillance system. It
therefore has the opportunity to quantify the effect of
the Glenochil judgment on a range of HIV indicators
including uptake of HIV testing by infected people in
sentinel groups, numbers of diagnoses of HIV within
24 months of last negative HIV test result, numbers of
recent HIV infections as judged by first CD4 count
above 650, and compliance with routine notification of
partners.10 The numbers of drug injectors having HIV
tests in Scotland rose from 1476 in 1996 to 2430 in
1999.16 Such tests resulted in 16 diagnoses in 1999.12
Miss Craig had hoped to prevent even one new
infection.5 By contrast, the figure shows the plausible
scenarios for reduced uptake of HIV tests by people
infected with HIV, who may now be more reluctant to
be tested. A 25% decrease in uptake of HIV testing by
those who are infected could result in more than a one
third increase in new sexually transmitted HIV
infections—even if, in accordance with the Glenochil
judgment, those tested always disclosed their infection
to sexual partners. If uptake of HIV tests fell as low as
40% (the uptake among Glenochil prisoners at the
time of the infection control exercise1 17) new sexually
transmitted infections might almost double.
Although our figure offers a guide to risk
assessment, the key probabilities of HIV test uptake,
disclosure, and condom use by people infected with
HIV test - 80%
Before
Disclosure - 90% Non-disclosure - 10%
Condoms not
used - 10%
Condoms not
used - 30%
Condoms not
used - 60%
Transmission potential
0.8 x 0.9 x 0.1 = 0.072
Transmission potential
0.8 x 0.1 x 0.3 = 0.024
Transmission potential
= 0.22
Transmission potential
0.2 x 1.0 x 0.6 = 0.12
No HIV test - 20%
Non-disclosure - 100%
HIV test - 60%
Scenario 1
Disclosure - 100% Non-disclosure - 0%
Condoms not
used - 10%
Condoms not
used - 0%
Condoms not
used - 60%
Transmission potential
0.6 x 1.0 x 0.1 = 0.06
Transmission potential
0.6 x 0 x 0 = 0
Transmission potential
= 0.3
Transmission potential
0.4 x 1.0 x 0.6 = 0.24
No HIV test - 40%
Non-disclosure - 100%
HIV test - 40%
Scenario 2
Disclosure - 100% Non-disclosure - 0%
Condoms not
used - 10%
Condoms not
used - 0%
Condoms not
used - 60%
Transmission potential
0.4 x 1.0 x 0.1 = 0.04
Transmission potential
0.4 x 0 x 0 = 0
Transmission potential
= 0.4
Transmission potential
0.6 x 1.0 x 0.6 = 0.36
No HIV test - 60%
Non-disclosure - 100%
Effect of different uptakes of HIV testing and disclosure rates on
transmission of HIV (uptake before Glenochil judgment and 25%
reduction in uptake (scenario 1) and 50% reduction in uptake
(scenario 2) after the judgment)
Education and debate
1175BMJ VOLUME 323 17 NOVEMBER 2001 bmj.com
HIV before and after Glenochil judgment need to be
estimated appropriately for Scotland. We urge
Scotland’s health minister to commission the necessary
measurements to guide medical and legal decision
making. This is a more responsible approach than
waiting passively until we have evidence that infectious
harm has been done.
Quality and content of HIV counselling:
need for national proforma?
High uptake of HIV testing by people with high expo›
sure to HIV is one measure of the quality of HIV coun›
selling.18 19 Other measures include curtailing spread of
HIV infection by counselled or diagnosed people
(which molecular investigations can shed light on);
limiting the HIV infection rate among counselled
clients who have tested HIV antibody negative (to
which data from Scotland’s denominator study gives
insight16); and random follow up to audit risk
perceptions and behaviour change among those coun›
selled (according to whether they elected to have an
HIV test).
The infection control exercise at Glenochil Prison
in 1993 did not score highly on these measures.1 17 It
was limited to the prison’s 378 adult inmates on 28
June 1993, of whom only 162 (43%) had an HIV test.
Some members of the counselling team were ambiva›
lent about the benefits of HIV diagnosis during incar›
ceration,4 and the fact that 258 other men who had
been in Glenochil Prison during January to June 1993
were not contacted places a question mark over its
score on the last two of our quality measures.
In future, the quality of HIV counselling may mat›
ter in law in Scotland. To safeguard both HIV counsel›
lors and clients, a national proforma needs to be drawn
up to assist in eliciting and reducing risk behaviours,
working out the index patient’s seroconversion interval
(time between last known negative date to earliest HIV
positive date), and documenting HIV exposures (HIV
seroconversion illness, condom breakage, assault, etc).
If exposure occurred after the infector’s HIV diagnosis,
it now matters in criminal justice terms, whether HIV
had been disclosed to the patient.
The proforma for use by both HIV counsellors and
clients should explain in plain language the legal rami›
fications of the Glenochil judgment. It may have to
advise people to disclose their HIV infection to sexual
(and injecting) partners before two witnesses. The
Cuerrier judgment in Canada has made HIV
disclosure to sexual partners obligatory in law, even if
condoms are used always.15 Written guidance to and
from HIV counsellors makes this clear to clients.
Effect on molecular epidemiology
Molecular epidemiology has enormous potential to
discover, document, and sensitively interrupt HIV (and
other) transmission networks. But the ability of the
police to obtain a warrant to access unnamed molecu›
lar research data in the case of R v Kelly has made this
information forensic evidence.20 Informed consent
notwithstanding, can doctors and scientists continue to
appeal to patients, especially prisoners, to contribute
samples for molecular studies when there is a risk that
incriminating evidence will be discovered?
Three follow up studies on the Glenochil outbreak
were not pursued because they had the potential to give
incriminating evidence about secondary transmission of
the Glenochil virus to male injectors outside Glenochil,
to female injectors, or to women with a male injector as
sexual partner. But because an estimated 30% of HIV
infections in the Glenochil outbreak were not diagnosed
at the time,2 a follow up study to discover the “missing”
Glenochil infections was instigated. It periodically
matched the master indices (first initial, soundex of sur›
name,21 sex, and date of birth) for the 636 inmates of
Glenochil Prison during January to June 1993 against
the similarly indexed HIV register for Scotland.22 23 This
study, which had just completed matching to the end of
January 2001, has now been halted. Patients with HIV
whose master index matches with someone on the
Glenochil list will not be approached.
Conclusion
Far from protecting the public, the Glenochil
judgment has endorsed abrogation of individual
responsibility in sexual partnerships by asserting a
legal duty of disclosure on the infected partner. It is
likely to undermine uptake of HIV testing and risks a
one third increase in new HIV infections in Scotland.
The effect of the judgment on HIV counselling is also
substantial.17 A national proforma is required for use
by HIV counsellors and clients in Scotland that prop›
erly explains the legal situation. The dual goals of
notifying partners (HIV prevention and earlier
diagnosis and treatment) have also been seriously
threatened. The prosecution of Mr Kelly has also
underlined the need for research scientists to
anticipate that potentially incriminating results, even
in unlabelled studies, may be followed up by forensic
requests from individual study participants or by
police warrant.24 25 We believe that urgent review by
the Scottish Executive is required to minimise the
negative effects on public health and molecular
science.
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Prospective health impact assessment: pitfalls, problems,
and possible ways forward
Jayne Parry, Andrew Stevens
“The general objective of such assessments is to
improve knowledge about the potential impact of a
policy or programme, inform decision›makers and
affected people, and facilitate adjustment of the
proposed policy in order to mitigate the negative and
maximize the positive impacts.”
European Centre for Health Policy1
The long tradition of never considering the impact on
health of public investment has ended. The white
paper Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation exhorted local
decision makers to “think about the effects which their
policies have on health, and in particular, how they can
reduce health inequality,”2 a recommendation that
echoes statements made in the Acheson report, by the
European Union, and by the World Health
Organization.3–5
In the United Kingdom, government support for
assessment of the health impact of policies has contin›
ued with the recent call for proposals for health impact
assessment projects under the inequalities in health
research programme, the establishment of a cross
departmental health impact assessment group in cen›
tral government, and the organisation and publication
of methodological seminars and reports.6–8 The
European Centre for Health Policy of the World
Health Organization has produced a series of publica›
tions that includes the “Gothenberg paper,” regarded
by many as the key document in stating the aims,
objectives, and methods for health impact assessment.1
Increasing recognition of the effects of the
socioeconomic and physical environment on health
may, on the face of it, make it difficult to question the
philosophy of health impact assessment—indeed the
hype currently surrounding health impact assessment
would imply that it is the indispensable condition of
policy investment. But what is health impact assess›
ment, and can it in its present format reliably inform
better decision making?
What is health impact assessment?
Health impact assessment has been variously, albeit
similarly, defined (see box). In short, it is about
estimating the health consequences of new projects
Summary points
Proponents of health impact assessment claim
that it can inform policy and decision making to
maximise benefits and minimise negative impacts
on health
Current health impact assessment is insufficiently
rigorous to make robust assumptions on the
magnitude or even the direction of the health
impacts of policy interventions
Review of the literature and consultation with
stakeholders are the key tools of health impact
assessment, but both have associated problems
Validation of the predictions of health impact
assessment raises issues such as the accurate
measurement of health and the use of control
populations
Local decision makers should adopt a process of
mini health impact assessment, involving the use
of available evidence, little quantification, and
limited consultation
Full (maxi) health impact assessment should be
undertaken only in a rigorous and effective way,
involving robust methods and evaluation after
implementation
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